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The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances –A Ten Year Perspective: Is
International Cooperation Merely Illusory?
Jimmy Gurule

Abstract
On the ten-year anniversary of the adoption of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, this Article analyzes whether signatory- parties have complied with the duties and obligations imposed
thereunder, and, in particular, whether the Convention has enhanced international cooperation in
narcotics enforcement. Part I of this Article examines the legal obligations and duties imposed
under the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, with special emphasis on the provisions aimed at criminalizing money laundering and at forfeiture of illicit drug proceeds and instrumentalities of narcotics trafficking. Additionally, Part I examines the requirement that parties afford one another the
“widest measure of mutual legal assistance in [narcotics] investigations, prosecutions, and judicial
proceedings,” and whether signatories to the Convention are in compliance with this obligation.
Part II analyzes whether foreign countries are in compliance with the obligations imposed by the
1988 U.N. Drug Convention to enact domestic anti-money laundering legislation and to assist one
another in drug forfeiture proceedings. Part III scrutinizes U.S. compliance under the Convention,
focusing on domestic legislation criminalizing international money laundering and authorizing
forfeiture of foreign drug proceeds found in the United States, as well as forfeiture of property
located abroad. Part III then examines whether these domestic criminal provisions have been aggressively implemented. Finally, Part IV examines whether enforcement of the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention should be pursued through the International Court of Justice and whether compliance
should be encouraged through international asset sharing.

THE 1988 U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES-A TEN YEAR
PERSPECTIVE: IS INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION MERELY ILLUSORY?
Jimmy Guruli*
INTRODUCTION
Modern crime is international in nature and transcends national borders. This fact is particularly true in the case of international narcotics trafficking, where drug dealers often have extensive ties in foreign countries. For example, coca, the raw material for cocaine, is grown exclusively in the South American
countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Narcotics cartels operate plantations in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, the world's largest source of coca, as well as plantations in Bolivia and Colombia.' At the same time, Mexico has become the gateway for the
importation of cocaine into the United States. Over seventy percent of the cocaine distributed in the United States enters
through the United States-Mexico border. 2 Moreover, the con* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Notre Dame Law
School. Professor Gurul& would like to recognize Prof. Sandra Guerra for her invaluable contribution to this Article, as well as Karen DuBay, J.D. Candidate, 1999, Notre
Dame Law School, and Patti Ugden, Research Librarian, for their diligent research
assistance.
1. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY, 1998, A TEN YEAR PLAN 49 [hereinafter DCS]. Bolivia and Colombia are the
world's second and third leading producers of cocaine hydrochloride. Bolivia produces
over a quarter of the world's coca leaf and about 30 percent of its cocaine supply. See
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAw ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1997, at 16 (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter INCS REPORT]. "Colombia remains the world's leading distributor of cocaine and
an important supplier of heroin and marijuana." Id. While there has been some progress in reducing the coca production in Bolivia and Peru over the last two years, this
has been offset by a 56 percent expansion in coca cultivation in Colombia during that

same period. See DCS, supra, at 49.
2. See INCS REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report sets forth the following:
Mexico now rivals Colombia as the center of the Western Hemisphere drug
trade. Mexican drug syndicates have divided up the territory with the Colombian organizations, gradually assuming responsibility for the wholesale distribution of most of the cocaine moving to the United States.
Id.at 10. Mexico also accounts for as much as 20 percent of the U.S. heroin market.

ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
tinued flow of cocaine and other illicit drugs into the United
States poses a fundamental threat to the domestic and foreign
interests of the United States.3
While illegal drugs are imported into the United States
from other countries, the enormous profits generated from drug
trafficking are frequently transferred out of the country and deposited into bank accounts in other countries4 to avoid seizure
by U.S. law enforcement authorities and forfeiture by U.S.
courts. The schemes to launder drug money are sophisticated
and "it is not unusual to find an intricate web of domestic and
foreign bank accounts, dummy corporations and other business
entities through which funds are moved, almost instantaneously,
by means of electronic transfers. ' 5 This pattern of importing illicit drugs into the United States from abroad and laundering
drug proceeds by transferring money outside the United States
to bank accounts in other countries has become the modus operandi for international drug traffickers.
The headquarters for the most notorious international drug
cartels are located outside the United States where drug kingpins often operate with impunity and without fear of apprehension and criminal prosecution. The leaders of these drug syndicates avoid entry into the United States altogether, knowing that
they run a much greater risk of being arrested in the United
States than abroad, and, if arrested, cannot bribe their way to
freedom.
In order to apprehend and to prosecute these international
drug offenders successfully, law enforcement officials must abandon traditional techniques in favor of bold and innovative
counter-narcotics strategies. Any such initiative must include
two principal components. First, this new law enforcement stratSee U.S.

1997
3 [hereinafter COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY].
3. Based on recent accounts, the retail value of the cocaine available for consumption in the United States each year is between US$40 and US$52 billion. See DCS, supra
note 1, at 46.
4. For example, money is often transferred into accounts in Luxembourg, Panama, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering. The
Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REv. 143, 191 (1995) (explaining that Panama, Bahamas, and Cayman Islands are offshore banking havens).
5. Jimmy Gurul6, The Money Laundering ControlAct of 1986: Creating a New Federal
Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified
Unlawful Activity?, 32 Am. GRIM. L. REv. 823, 854 n.3 (1995) (citations omitted).
DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT:

COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY
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egy must be international in scope. 6 Specifically, U.S. law enforcement officials must aggressively pursue investigations
abroad with the cooperation of other country's law enforcement
officials. Second, it has long been recognized that "if law enforcement efforts [directed at international organized crime]
are to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects" of drug trafficking and other related crimes. 7
A report recently released by the U.S. State Department's,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
makes a compelling case for severely punishing money laundering activity:
Money laundering has devastating social consequences and is
a threat to national security because money laundering provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and
6. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988)
[hereinafter U.N. Drug Convention]. The preamble of the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("U.N. Drug Convention" or "Convention") recognizes the importance of international cooperation in
combating drug trafficking. It provides that "eradication of illicit traffic is a collective
responsibility of all States and that, to that end, coordinated action within the framework of international cooperation is necessary." U.N. Drug Convention, supra, U.N.
Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, at 1-2 (The preamble is not reprinted in I.L.M., but is available in
U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/15); see DCS, supra note 1, at 44 ("Because traffickers do not
respect national borders, no country can deal effectively with illicit drug trafficking
alone. Multinational efforts are essential for making optimal use of limited assets.").
7. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 (discussing legislation to strengthen criminal forfeiture laws). In enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), the U.S. Congress realized that any
strategy intended to combat organized crime successfully must include an attack on the
enormous profits generated by organized crime, as well as their infiltration into legitimate businesses. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1994). Senator McClellan, a chief sponsor of RICO, posited that:
What is needed.., are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals,
but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute
[A]n
such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation ....
attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack
must take place on all available fronts.
See S. RaP. No. 91-617, at 79 (1969) (citations omitted); see also Lowell Quillen, The
InternationalAttack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives, 1991 DuKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 213, 213 (1991). Quillen posits that:
After years of failed efforts to curb either supply or demand, international
drug enforcement authorities have determined that the best way to cripple the
$300 billion drug industry is to attack the drug traffickers' profit motive. Without the ability to transfer and disguise their enormous gains, drug cartels
could operate only at a small fraction of current levels.
Quillen, supra.
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other criminals to operate and expand their criminal enterprises. In doing so, criminals manipulate financial systems in
the United States and abroad. Unchecked, money laundering can erode the integrity of a nations' financial institutions.
Due to the high integration of capital markets, money laundering can also negatively affect national and global interest
rates as launderers reinvest funds where their schemes are
less likely to be detected rather than where rates of return are
higher because of sound economic principles. Organized financial crime is assuming an increasingly significant role that
threatens the safety and security of peoples, states, and democratic institutions. Moreover, our ability to conduct foreign
policy and to promote our economic security and prosperity
is hindered by these threats to our democratic and free-mar8
ket partners.

Thus, any effective anti-drug strategy must: (1) criminalize
money laundering and (2) deprive drug traffickers of their illicit
drug profits through the enforcement of tough asset forfeiture
laws. Furthermore, both of these objectives must be aggressively
pursued on an international scale. Otherwise, "without cooperation among all nations affected by illegal drug activity, traffickers
can defeat domestic forfeiture laws simply by removing their illicit wealth from the jurisdiction in which it is generated."9
The United States is party to several multilateral and bilateral treaties intended to foster international cooperation in narcotics enforcement.1 ° The most important of these international
anti-drug conventions is the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit
8. See INCS REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
9. William J. Snider, InternationalCooperationin the Forfeiture of Illegal DrugProceeds, 6
CuM. L.F. 377, 378 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964) [hereinafter Single Convention]; Protocol Amending the Single Convention, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1975) [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 2, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976) [hereinafter Psychotropic Convention].
The United States is a party to several other multilateral conventions intended to
foster international cooperation in confronting terrorism and other violent crimes. See,
e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (entered into force June 3, 1983) (entered into force for
the United States Dec. 7, 1984); Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force
Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into
force Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention for the Suppression
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Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("1988
U.N. Drug Convention" or "Convention"). 1 "The purpose of
this Convention is to promote cooperation among the Parties so
that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having
an international dimension.'
In many cases, however, foreign
nations have been reluctant, or simply unwilling, to comply with
the obligations imposed under the Convention. With respect to
the United States, federal prosecutors, for whatever reason, have
failed to utilize effectively the full panoply of legal tools authorized to implement the Convention. Money laundering prosecutions in the United States have been predominantly domestic in
scope. Emphasis on domestic investigations and prosecutions at
the expense of international cooperative efforts is a prescription
for failure and will ensure the continued growth and proliferation of international drug trafficking and organized crime.
On the ten-year anniversary of the adoption of the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention, this Article analyzes whether signatoryparties have complied with the duties and obligations imposed
thereunder, and, in particular, whether the Convention has enhanced international cooperation in narcotics enforcement.
Part I of this Article examines the legal obligations and duties
imposed under the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, with special
emphasis on the provisions aimed at criminalizing money laundering and at forfeiture of illicit drug proceeds and instrumentalities of narcotics trafficking. Additionally, Part I examines the
requirement that parties afford one another the "widest measure
of mutual legal assistance in [narcotics] investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings," 3 and whether signatories to the
Convention are in compliance with this obligation.
Part II analyzes whether foreign countries are in compliance
with the obligations imposed by the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention
to enact domestic anti-money laundering legislation and to assist
one another in drug forfeiture proceedings. Part III scrutinizes
U.S. compliance under the Convention, focusing on domestic
legislation criminalizing international money laundering and auof Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
11. See U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, 28 I.L.M. 493.
12. Id. art. 2(1), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
13. Id. art. 7(1), 28 I.L.M. at 508.
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thorizing forfeiture of foreign drug proceeds found in the
United States, as well as forfeiture of property located abroad.
Part III then examines whether these domestic criminal provisions have been aggressively implemented. Finally, Part IV examines whether enforcement of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention
should be pursued through the International Court of Justice
and whether compliance should be encouraged through international asset sharing.
I. THE 1988 U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC
IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES
Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in
the illicit production of and trafficking in narcotic drugs, and
cognizant that this trend could only be reversed through "coordinated action within the framework of international cooperation, '"" the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs convened a
conference in Vienna, Austria from November 25 to December
20, 1988, to consider the adoption of a multilateral treaty to
combat international drug trafficking. The treaty was intended
to supplement and to reinforce several earlier U.N. measures
contained in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 15 as
amended by the 1972 Protocol,1 6 and the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. 17 The result of the conference was the
adoption of the 1998 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 18 To date, more
than 150 countries are parties to the 1988 U.N. Drug Conven14. See U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, at 2.
15. Single Convention, supra note 10.
16. Geneva Protocol, supra note 10.
17. Psychotropic Convention, supra note 10.
18. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6. At the signing ceremony on December
20, 1988, the following nations signed the Convention: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Cyprus,
Denmark, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan,
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
Republic of Tanzania, the United States, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See
U.N. Web Page on the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://
www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part-boo/vi-bo o/vi_19.html> (on file
with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal) [hereinafter U.N. Web Page] (providing list of
signatories and parties to 1988 U.N. Drug Convention with respective dates of signature). Morocco signed on December 28, 1988. Id.
It should be emphasized that the U.S. Constitution provides that treaties as well as
executive agreements are incorporated into the body of U.S. law, making them enforce-
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tion.19
The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention is expansive in scope and
coverage. It establishes internationally-recognized offenses relating to drug trafficking and money laundering that are to be
criminalized under the domestic laws of the parties to the Convention. It also creates a framework for international cooperation to bring to justice those persons who profit from drug trafficking.2 ° The Convention further requires each party to enact
far-reaching domestic laws providing for the "confiscation," defined as freezing, seizing, and forfeiting, of drug proceeds or instrumentalities used, intended to be used, or derived from pro21
scribed drug trafficking activities.
The central purpose of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention is
set forth in Article 2 of the Convention, which provides: "The
able. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, art. II, § 1; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230
(1942).
19. The following nations are parties to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Denmark, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, the European Community, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
the Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sio Tom6 and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the
United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. U.N. Web Page, supra note 18.
20. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizingthe War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENy. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 387, 387 (1990) (providing excellent summary of more important provisions of
1988 U.N. Drug Convention).
21. The preamble to the U.N. Drug Convention expressly addresses this concern:
"Determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing .
See U.N.
Drug Convention, supra note 6, pmbl, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, at 1.
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purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among
parties so that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimension."22
To that end, Article 3(1) (a) obliges each party to establish
as criminal offenses under its domestic law a comprehensive list
of activities involved in or related to drug trafficking, including:
the production, manufacture, distribution, cultivation, possession, or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, as well as the manufacture, transportation, or distribution of any equipment, materials, or substances knowing that
they are to be used to manufacture illicit drugs.23 In addition,
each party is required to criminalize the organization, management, or financing of the drug offenses enumerated in the Convention.2 4
Article 3(1) (b) requires each party to enact domestic legislation criminalizing money laundering activity. 25 For purposes
of the Convention, money laundering is defined as:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such
property is derived from any offence or offences established
in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph ....
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of
the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal
consequences of his actions; [and]
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived
from an offence or offences established in accordance with
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph ....
Failure to enact domestic legislation criminalizing efforts aimed
at concealing or disguising the illicit source of drug and money
laundering proceeds constitutes non-compliance under the Convention.27
22. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 500.
23. Id. art. 3(1) (a) (i)-(iv), 28 I.L.M. at 500-501.
24. Id. art. 3(1)(a)(v), 28 I.L.M. at 501.
25. This obligation is new and not required by either the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs of 1961 ("Single Convention"), supra note 10, or the Protocol Amending the Single Convention ("Geneva Convention"), supra note 10.
26. See U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(1) (b)(i)-(ii), 28 I.L.M. at 501.
27. Id. art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 504.

82

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:74

Article 5 is particularly important and imposes several duties
on parties to the Convention. Pursuant to Article 5, parties shall
adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation
of drug trafficking and money laundering proceeds, as well as
the instrumentalities used to commit such offenses. 21 Under this
provision, each party is obliged to enact domestic legislation to
permit forfeiture of:
(a) Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance
with Article 3, Paragraph 1, or property, the value of which
corresponds to that of such proceeds; [and]
(b) Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials
and equipment or other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in any manner in offences established in accordance with Article 3, Paragraph 1.21
28. The Convention uses the term "confiscation." Article 1 (f) defines "confiscation" as "the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent
authority." This definition includes forfeiture where applicable. See id. art. 1 (f), 28
I.L.M. at 499. It should further be noted that the duty of confiscation is not new under
treaty-based law. See Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs, Oct. 26, 1939, art. 10, 198 U.N.T.S. 299, 305 (imposing first duty of confiscation). The duty of seizure and confiscation is also mandated by Article 37 of the Single
Convention. Article 37 provides: "Any drugs, substances and equipment used in or
intended for the commission of any of the offences, referred to in Article 36, shall be
liable to seizure and confiscation." Single Convention, supra note 10, art. 37, 18 U.S.T.
at 1426, 520 U.N.T.S. at 254.
29. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 504. In addition to
forfeiting drug proceeds, property traceable to such proceeds is forfeitable under the
U.N. Drug Convention. Article 5(6) (a) of the Convention provides that "[i]f proceeds
have been transformed or converted into other property, such property shall be liable
to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds." Id. art. 5(6) (a), 28
I.L.M. at 506. Thus, if drug proceeds have been commingled with property acquired
from a legitimate source, the Convention provides that "such property shall ... be
liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds." Id. art.
5(6) (b), 28 I.L.M. at 506. Additionally, income or other benefits derived from: (i)
proceeds, (ii) property into which proceeds have been transformed or converted, or
(iii) property with which proceeds have been intermingled shall be forfeitable in the
same manner and to the same extent as proceeds. Id. art. 5(6) (c), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
The Convention further preserves the rights of innocent bona fide third parties. Id. art.
5(8), 28 I.L.M. at 507.
It should be noted that the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ("European Laundering Convention") also imposes a duty on the parties to "adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property" of crime. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, art. 2, 30 I.L.M. 148, 150 [hereinafter European Laundering Convention]. On November 8, 1990, the European
Laundering Convention was signed by the representatives of the following countries:
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, the
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It should be emphasized that the existence of bank secrecy
laws does not constitute a valid defense to compliance under Article 5. Article 5(3) provides that each signatory to the Convention "shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to
order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. ' 30 To that end, the Convention explicitly
states that "[a] party shall not decline to act under the provisions
of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy. 31
Additionally, Article 5(2) requires each party's competent
authorities to enact legislation "to identify, trace, and freeze or
seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other [property] ...for the purpose of eventual confiscation. '32 Pursuant to
Article 5(2), each party is obliged to enact domestic laws to restrain or freeze forfeitable assets prior to the entry of a domestic
judgment of forfeiture. 3 Article 5(4) (b) requires that a party
restrain or freeze assets for the benefit of the requesting party. 4
In addition, Article 5(4) (b) provides that following a request by
another party having jurisdiction over an offense established in
accordance with the Convention, "the requested party shall take
measures to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities . . .for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting party or . . .by the
35
requested party."
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The European Laundering Convention represents an important effort towards international cooperation in combatting drug trafficking and money laundering. The United States is
examining whether to sign the Convention.
30. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(3), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
31. Id. One commentator has noted that this provision, and a related undertaking
in Article 7 of the Convention not to invoke bank secrecy in the context of a request for
mutual legal assistance, are among the most important provisions in terms of the prosecution of international drug trafficking and money laundering offenses. See Stewart,
supra note 20, at 387, 391.
32. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2), 28 I.L.M. at 504. The European
Laundering Convention contains a similar provision. Article 11 of this convention provides:
At the request of another party which has instituted criminal proceedings or
proceedings for the purpose of confiscation, a party shall take the necessary
provisional measures, such as freezing or seizing, to prevent any dealing in,
transfer or disposal of property which, at a later stage, may be the subject of a
request for confiscation or which might be such as to satisfy the request.
European Laundering Convention, supra note 29, art. 11, 30 I.L.M. at 153-54.
33. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2), 28 I.L.M. at 504.
34. Id. art. 5(4) (b), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
35. Id.
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Finally, if forfeitable property is located in the territory of a
party, the requested party shall, upon request by another party,
take either of two courses of action. First, pursuant to Article
5(4) (a) (i), if forfeitable property is located in its territory, the
requested party shall, upon request, obtain an order of confiscation.36 If such an order is granted, the requested party shall give
it effect.17 Alternatively, under Article 5(4) (a) (ii), upon request,
the requested party shall enforce other countries' order of forfeiture entered with respect to property situated in its territory.3
Article 5(4) (a) (ii) obliges a party to "[s]ubmit to [the countries]
competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to... an order
of confiscation issued by the requesting party..., in so far as it
relates to proceeds, property, [or] instrumentalities ... situated
in the territory of the requested party."3 9
The Convention further requires that each party afford one
another "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings" in relation to
criminal offenses established in accordance with the Convention. 40 This duty extends to enforcement of counter-narcotics,
money laundering, and asset forfeiture laws. In the context of
asset forfeiture proceedings, the Convention establishes procedures by which one party may request assistance from another
country to seize or to restrain forfeitable property located in its
territory pending a judgment of forfeiture. This procedure is
intended to prevent the property from being removed from the
territory to avoid confiscation. 4 1 Additionally, upon request, the
36. Id. art. 5(4)(a)(i), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 5(4) (a) (ii), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 7(1), 28 I.L.M. at 508. The importance of international cooperation in
combatting illicit drug trafficking is recognized by the Single Convention. Single Convention, supra note 10, art. 35, 18 U.S.T. at 1425, 520 U.N.T.S. at 250. Article 35(c)
requires parties to: cooperate closely with each other and with the competent international organizations of which they are members with a view to maintaining a coordinated campaign against the illicit traffic. Id. art. 35(c), 18 U.S.T. at 1425, 520 U.N.T.S.
at 250. Article 35(d) further provides that parties "[e]nsure that international cooperation between the appropriate agencies be conducted in an expeditious manner." Id.
art. 35(d), 18 U.S.T. at 1425, 520 U.N.T.S. at 250; see Geneva Protocol, supra note 10,
art. 13(d)-(e), 26 U.S.T. at 1450, 976 U.N.T.S. at 1I (mandating international cooperation against drug trafficking).
41. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(4)(a)(i), (ii), 28 I.L.M. at 505. It
should be noted that U.S. law currently permits the forfeiture of property located in the
United States "constituting, derived from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained di-
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requested party is obliged
to enforce another country's judg2
ment of forfeiture.1
II. FOREIGN COUNTRY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1988 U.N.
DRUG CONVENTION
A. Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
At the signing ceremony held on December 20, 1988, the
representatives of forty-three nations signed the U.N. Drug Conventioni.1 The number has since grown to more than 150 signatory countries.4 4 Over the last ten years, however, the record of
compliance with Article 3(1) (b), which imposes a duty to enact
domestic anti-money laundering legislation,4 5 has been sporadic
and inconsistent. Today, several parties to the Convention have
yet to enact laws criminalizing money laundering. Additionally,
in many cases, parties have failed to enforce anti-money laundering laws aggressively. The members of the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering4 6 ("FAFT") have realized significant compliance. Every member of FAFT has enacted domestic
laws criminalizing money laundering. Many of these members,
however, have only recently enacted anti-money laundering laws
rectly or indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture,
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance" if such offense would have
been punishable by imprisonment for one year or more if it had occurred in the United
States. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a) (1) (B) (1994); see European Laundering Convention,
supra note 29, art. 13, 30 I.L.M. at 152.
42. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(4) (a) (ii), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
45. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(1) (b), 28 I.L.M. at 501.
46. See Evaluation of Laws and Systems in Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering Members Dealing with Asset Confiscation and Provisional Measures
("FATF Evaluation"). Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") was initiated by the seven
leading industrialized democracies, known as the G-7 countries. On June 20, 1988, at a
meeting in Toronto, Canada, the G-7 countries pledged to establish a task force on
international narcotics trade as part of a broader effort to stop the production, trafficking, and financing of illicit drugs. On April 23, 1990, FATF released a report issuing
recommendations on combatting money laundering, including a recommendation to
enact domestic anti-money laundering laws. See Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture Internationaland Foreign Law: An Emerging Regime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
445, 460 (1991). Other nations joined the G-7 countries in this effort. FAFT members
include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Nineteen members of FAF' have ratified the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention. Id.
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or made significant amendments to strengthen previously weak
money laundering statutes. Thus, even as to these members
there have been relatively few successful money laundering prosecutions and convictions.
Several major drug-producing or major drug-transit countries have failed to enact anti-money laundering legislation.
These countries include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Uruguay.4 7 Several of these countries are original signatories to the Convention. 4 8 Other signatory nations have not aggressively enforced
provisions of their recently-passed anti-money laundering laws.49
Nations with a poor record of enforcing their domestic money
laundering laws include: Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, and Paraguay.5 ° The record
of non-compliance, by several of the major drug-producing and
major drug-transit countries, is particularly disturbing and seriously calls into question the efficacy of the Convention.
In February 1998, the Clinton Administration determined
that Afghanistan and Iran-both original signatories to the Con47. See INCS REPORT, supra note 1.
48. Afghanistan, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Iran signed the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention at the signing ceremony on December 20, 1988. U.N. Web Page, supra note 18.
49. For example, Brazil is recognized as a major money laundering country for
illicit drug proceeds. See Paulina L. Jerez, Proposed Brazilian Money Laundering Legislation: Analysis and Recommendations, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 329, 337, 352 (1997)
(explaining that Brazil is excellent money laundering location because of strong currency, stable economy, geographic location, weak anti-money laundering laws, and lack
of coordination between government agencies). In March 1998, Brazil enacted antimoney laundering legislation for the first time. See President Cardoso promulgates antimoney-laundering law, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 7, 1998 (discussing Brazil's Law on Crimes on Occultation of Assets and Values (money laundering)).
50. Colombia enacted money laundering legislation in 1995, but has not successfully prosecuted any cases under these provisions; Paraguay promulgated money laundering legislation in 1996, but the laws have not been enforced. See INCS Report,
supra note 1, at 17. Several other countries that signed and ratified the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention have also failed to enforce aggressively their domestic money laundering
statutes. These countries include: Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, and Nigeria. Id. at 56, 61, 76, 85, 91.
Mexico continues to be the money laundering haven of choice for laundering U.S.
drug proceeds. During 1996 and 1997, Mexico strengthened its anti-money laundering
laws by making money laundering a felony punishable by longer jail sentences. The
first and only prosecution under this new legislation, however, was dismissed last year.
Id. at 85. On December 15, 1997, the Honduran Congress passed legislation criminalizing money laundering for the first time in Honduras. To date, there are no reported
prosecutions under the Honduran money laundering statute. Id. at 69.
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vention-as well as Nigeria 5 ' had not met the standards set forth
in 22 U.S.C. § 2291h of the Foreign Assistance Act 52 (the "Act"),
and were not in full compliance with the goals and objectives of
the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. 53 Other signatories to the Convention, including Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay, were also
51. Nigeria was not one of the original signatories to the Convention. Nigeria
signed the Convention on March 1, 1989, ratifying it on November 14, 1989. U.N. Web
Page, supra note 18.
52. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291h (1994).
53. See Presidential Determination No. 98-15, Memorandum for the Secretary of
State, signed by President William J. Clinton (Feb. 26, 1998). The law requires the
President to determine whether countries have cooperated fully with the United States
or taken adequate steps to meet the counter-narcotics goals and objectives of the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention. The denial of certification involves foreign assistance sanctions, as well as a mandatory U.S. vote against multilateral development bank loans. 22
U.S.C. § 2291h provides in relevant part:
(a) Withholding of bilateral assistance and opposition to multilateral development assistance(1) Bilaterial assistance-Fifty percent of the United States assistance allocated each fiscal year in the report required by section 2413 of this title for
each major illicit drug producing country or major drug-transit country shall
be withheld from obligation and expenditure, except as provided in subsection (b) ...
(2) Multilateral assistance-The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to
vote, on and after March 1 of each year, against any loan or other utilization of
the funds of their respective institution to or for any major illicit drug producing country or major drug-transit country ....
tion (b) of this section ....

except as provided in subsec-

(b) Certification procedures(1) What must be certified-Subject to subsection (d) of this section, the
assistance withheld from a country pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section may be obligated and expended, and the requirement of subsection
(a) (2) of this section to vote against multilateral development bank assistance
to a country shall not apply, if the President determines and certifies to the
Congress, at the time of the submission of the report required by Section
2291h(a) of this title, that(A) during the previous year the country has cooperated fully with the United
States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full compliance with
the goals and objectives established by the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; or
(B) for a country that would not otherwise qualify for certification under subparagraph (A), the vital national interests of the United States require that the
assistance witheld pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section be provided
and that the United States not vote against multilateral development bank
assistance for that country pursuant to subsection (a) (2) of this section.
(e) Denial of assistance for countries decertifiedIf the President does not make a certification under subsection (b) of this
section with respect to a country or the Congress enacts a joint resolution
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found in non-compliance, but were admitted nonetheless, pursuant to section 2291j (b) (1) (B) of the Act, after a determination
that certification was in the "vital national interests" of the
United States.54 Thus, in retrospect, while some progress has
been realized, it appears that several of the most egregious drugtrafficking and drug-transit nations have consistently failed to
comply with the duties imposed under the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties on Asset Forfeiture
The United States is party to several mutual legal assistance
treaties ("MLAT"). 5 Generally, MLATs allow the parties to obdisapproving such certification, then until such time as the conditions specified in subsection (f) of this section are satisfied(1) funds may not be obligated for United States assistance for that country,
and funds previously obligated for United States assistance for that country
may not be expended for the purpose of providing assistance for that country;
and
(2) the requirement to vote against multilateral development bank assistance
pursuant to subsection (a) (2) of this section shall apply with respect to that
country, without regard to the date specified in that subsection.
22 U.S.C. § 2291j.
54. Presidential Determination No. 98-15, Memorandum for the Secretary of State,
signed by President William J. Clinton (Feb. 26, 1998). Colombia and Paraguay were
original signatories to the Convention. See U.N. Web Page, supra note 18. Pakistan
signed the Convention on December 20, 1989, ratifying it on October 25, 1991. See id.
55. See Alan Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
CriminalMatters, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAl. LAW PROCEDURE 151-79 (M. Bassiouni ed.,
1986) (discussing United States' mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs")).
The United States currently has operative MLATs with the following countries: Argentina, Treaty with Argentina on Mutual Legal Assitance in Criminal Matters, with
Attachments, Dec. 4, 1990, U.S.-Arg., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-18 (1993) (entered into
force Feb. 9, 1993) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Argentina]; the Bahamas, Bilateral Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas on the Control of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
Feb. 17, 1989, U.S.-Bah., T.I.A.S. No. 11602 (entered into force Feb. 17, 1989) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Bahamas]; Brazil, Mutual Cooperation Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil for
Reducing Demand, Preventing Illicit Use, and Combating Illicit Production and Traffic
of Drugs, Sept. 3, 1986, U.S.-Braz., 1991 WL 494968 (entered into forceJune 13, 1991)
[hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Brazil]; Canada, Treaty Between the United States and Canada
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., 1990 Can.
T.S. 19 (entered into forceJan. 24, 1990) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Canada]; Colombia,
Mutual Cooperation Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia to Combat, Prevent, and
Control Money Laundering Arising from Illicit Activies, Feb. 27, 1992, U.S.-Colom.,
1992 WL 465994 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Colombia];
Hungary, Treaty with Hungary on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 1,
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1994, U.S.-Hung., S. TREATV Doc. No. 104-20 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1997) [hereinafter MIAT U.S.-Hungary]; Israel, Agreement Between The Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel Regarding Mutual
Assistance in Customs Matters, May 16, 1996, U.S.-Isr., 1997 WL 734974 (entered into
force Sept. 24, 1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Israel]; Italy, Treaty with Italy on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, with Memorandum of Understanding, Nov. 9, 1982,
U.S.-Italy, 88 DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1988, at 91 (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Italy]; Mexico, Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States
and Mexico for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 19, 1987, U.S.-Mex., S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-13 (1987) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Mexico]; Morocco, Agreement Between the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the United States of
America Regarding Joint Cooperation in Fighting against International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Illicit Production, Trafficking, and Abuse of Narcotics, Feb. 10,
1989, 1989 WL 428827 (entered into force Feb. 10, 1989) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.Morocco]; the Netherlands, Agreement Between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding Mutual Cooperation in the Tracing, Freezing, Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities
of Crime and the Sharing of Forfeited Assets, Nov. 20, 1992, U.S.-Neth., 1994 WL
524966 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1994) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Netherlands]; Panama, Treaty with Panama on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 11, 1991, U.S.Pan., S. TREATV Doc. No. 102-15 (1991) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Panama]; the Phillippines, Treaty with the Phillippines on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Nov. 13, 1994, U.S.-Phil., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-18 (1994) (entered into force Nov. 23,
1996) [hereinafter MIAT U.S.-Phillippines]; St. Kitts and Nevis, Agreement Between
the Government of the United States and the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, Apr. 13, 1995, U.S.-St. Kitts & Nevis, 1995
WL 337143 (entered into force Apr. 13, 1995), as amended by Agreement between the
United States and St. Kitts and Nevis Amending the Agreement of April 13, 1995 Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, 1996 WL 482067 (entered into force June
27, 1996) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-St. Kitts]; South Korea, Treaty with the Republic of
Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 23, 1997, U.S.-Kor., 1993
WL 796842 (entered into force May 23, 1997) [hereinafter MAT U.S.-Korea]; Spain,
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, with attachments, Nov. 20,
1990, U.S.-Spain, 90 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1990, at 91 [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Spain];
Switzerland, Agreement Between the United States and Switzerland Relating to the
Treaty of May 25, 1973, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 3, 1993, U.S.Switz., 1993 WL 544335 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.Switzerland]; Thailand, Treaty Between the Government of Thailand and the Government of the United States of American Concerning Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, with attachments, Mar. 19, 1986, U.S.-Thail., S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-18 (1986)
[hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Thailand]; Turkey, Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, U.S.-Turk., 32 U.S.T. 3111 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981)
[hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Turkey]; the United Kingdom for Anguilla, the British Virgin
Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom-United States: Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assitance
in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K, 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) (entered into force
July 3, 1986) [hereinafter MLAT-Cayman]; United Kingdom, Treaty Between the
United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 2, 1996, S. TRFATY Doc. No.
104-2 (1996) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-U.K-]; Uruguay, Treaty with Uruguay on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 6, 1991, U.S.-Uru., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-19
(1994) (entered into force Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter MIAT U.S.-Uruguay]; and Vene-
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tain documentary evidence and other forms of legal assistance to
aid law enforcement authorities in investigating and prosecuting
criminal matters. These treaties establish direct channels of
communication, generally Justice-to-Justice, intended to expedite and to facilitate all categories of assistance. M[ATs provide
for a broad range of cooperation in criminal matters, including:
(1) taking testimony or statements of witnesses; (2) providing
documents, records, and evidence; (3) serving legal documents;
(4) locating or identifying persons; (5) executing requests for
zuela, Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Venezuela Regarding Cooperation in the Prevention
and Control of Money Laundering Arising From Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Nov. 5, 1990, U.S.-Venez., 1991 WL 494879 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1991) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Venezuela].
In addition, MLATs have been signed but not yet brought into force with an additional 15 governments: Antigua and Barbuda, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia, Apr. 19, 1995, 1995
WL 370397 [hereinafter Multi-MLAT]; Australia, Treaty Between the United States and
Australia on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 30, 1997, U.S.-Austl., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-27 (1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Australia]; Austria, Treaty with
Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Feb. 23, 1995, U.S.-Aus., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 104-21 (1995) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Austria]; Barbados, Treaty Between the United States and Barbados on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Feb. 28, 1996, U.S.-Barb., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-20 (1996) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.Barbados]; Belgium, Treaty with Belgium on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Maters,
with related notes, June 12 & Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Belg., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-17
(1987) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Belgium]; the Czech Republic, Treaty with Czech Republic on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Feb. 4,1998, U.S.-Czech Rep., S.
TREA'rv Doc. No. 105-47 (1998) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Czech]; Dominica, MultiMLAT, supra; Greneda, Multi-MLAT, supra; Hong Kong, Agreement with Hong Kong
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 15, 1997, U.S.-H.K., S. TREATY
Doc. No. 105-6 (1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Hong Kong]; Latvia, Treaty Between
the United States and the Republic of Latvia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
June 13, 1997, U.S.-Lat., 37 I.L.M. 749 (1998) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Latvia]; Lithuania, Lithuania-United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Jan. 16, 1998, U.S.-Lith., 37 I.L.M. 749 [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Lithuania]; Luxembourg, Treaty Between the United States and Luxembourg on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters, Mar. 13, 1997, U.S.-Lux., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-11 (1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Luxembourg]; Nigeria, Mutual Cooperation Agreement for Reducing Demand, Preventing Illicit Use, and Combating Illicit Production and Trafficking
in Drugs, Jan. 13, 1989, U.S.-Nig. 1989 WL 428859 [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Nigeria];
Poland, Treaty Between the United States and Poland on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, July 10, 1996, U.S.-Pol., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-13 (1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Poland]; St. Lucia, Multi-MLAT, supra; and Trinidad and Tobago, Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 4, 1996, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-22 (1997) [hereinafter MLAT U.S.-Trinidad]. The United States has also signed
the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 10,
1995, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-35 (1995) [hereinafter Inter-American MLAT].
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searches and seizures; and (6) providing assistance in proceedings related to the forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.5 6
The majority of recent MLATs explicitly address forfeiture
issues, setting forth procedures by which one country may request another country to identify, to trace, to freeze, or to seize
proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking activity.5"
"The parties are required to assist each other, to the extent permitted by their respective laws, in procedures relating to the immobilizing, securing, and forfeiting of the proceeds, fruits, and
instrumentalities of crime . ..
*.
,58 For example, the MLAT between Mexico and the United States specifically provides that, to
the extent permitted by their respective laws and procedures, a
requested country will assist in immobilizing, securing, and
forfeiting the proceeds, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime.5 9
The MLAT between the United States and the United Kingdom
is similar in this respect, providing that "[t] he parties shall assist
each other in proceedings involving the identification, tracing,
freezing, seizure or forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime."60
Article 5(4) (g) of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention provides
that each signatory shall conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties. a" The purpose of these bilateral and multilateral treaties is
to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation as it
relates to the forfeiture of drug proceeds and instrumentalities
of drug trafficking.6 2 Mutual legal assistance in relation to confiscation is divisible into three broad categories: (a) investigative
assistance to identify and to trace property and to obtain documents; (b) provisional measures to freeze or to seize property
56. See, e.g., MLAT U.S.-Canada, supra note 55, art. 2, 1990 Can. T.S. at 19.
57. See Snider, supra note 9, at 382-83.
58. See Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 46, at 478.
59. MLAT U.S.-Mexico, supra note 55, art. 11.
60. MLAT U.S.-U.K, supra note 55, art. 16.
61. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(4)(g), 28 I.L.M. at 505. Article
5(4) (g) states: "The parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties,
agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation
pursuant to this Article." Id.
62. Id. The duty of international cooperation is reinforced by Article 7(1), which
requires parties to afford one another "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in
investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal offenses"
established under the U.N. Drug Convention. Id. art. 7(1), 28 I.L.M. at 508.
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located in the territory of the requested party; and (c) enforcement of another country's confiscation orders.
The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention requires all three types of
legal assistance. First, Article 5(4) (b) requires mutual legal
assistance in the investigative stage of the forfeiture proceedings.63 This provision provides that following a request by another party, the requested party shall take measures to identify
and to trace forfeitable property. Thus, pursuant to Article
5(4) (b), the requested party would be obliged to make available
bank, financial, or commercial records located in its territory
that would be needed to identify and to trace property subject to
forfeiture in the requesting state.6 4
Second, Article 5(4) (b)requires each party to take provisional measures to "freeze or seize proceeds, property, [or] instrumentalities [of drug trafficking] . ..for the purpose of eventual confiscation."65 Thus, following a request, the requested
party is obliged to provide legal assistance to the requesting
party by seizing or freezing property located in its territory that is
the subject of a forfeiture action in the requesting state. Finally,
Article 5(4) (a) (ii) imposes a duty on the parties to enforce a
forfeiture order from another country.6 6 This provision requires
a party to provide assistance, upon request, by submitting a foreign forfeiture order to its competent authorities for the purpose of enforcement.6 7
63. Id. art. 5(4)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
64. Id. This obligation finds further support in Article 5(3), which provides:
In order to carry out the measures referred to in this article, each party shall
empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. A party shall not
decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank
secrecy.
Id. art. 5(3), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
65. Id. art. 5(4) (b), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
66. Id. art. 5(4) (a) (ii), 28 I.L.M. at 503.
67. Article 5(4) (a) (ii) provides in relevant part:
Following a request made pursuant to this article by another party havingjurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1,
the party in whose territory proceeds, property, instrumentalities ... shall:
(ii) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the
extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting party... .
in so far as it relates to proceeds, property, instrumentalities ... situated in the
territory of the requested party.
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Unfortunately, several recently-entered MLATs apparently
intended to implement the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, fall far
short of complying with the legal obligations of mutual assistance imposed under the Convention. The M[AT provisions are
formulated in loose terms with easy escape clauses. Often, these
provisions constitute nothing more than suggestions and recommendations, rather than imposing firm duties and obligations.
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is that the language used is
discretionary ("may") rather than mandatory ("shall"), thereby
imposing no duty or obligation to assist whatsoever. Furthermore, these MLATs often fail to require each party to assist in
freezing or restraining forfeitable assets so that they are not removed from the territory pending an order of forfeiture.
Equally disturbing, these MLATs are often silent, failing to require mutual assistance in enforcing foreign judicial forfeiture
orders.
For example, the MLAT between the United States and Barbados6" ("U.S.-Barbados MLAT") is discretionary rather than
mandatory, regarding the obligation of the requested party to
seize and to freeze assets located within its territory. The MLAT
provides that "[i]f the Central Authority of one Contracting
party becomes aware of proceeds or instrumentalities of offenses
which are located in the territory of the other party and may be
forfeitable or otherwise subject to seizure under the laws of that
party, it may so inform the Central Authority of the other
party. '"69 The use of the word "may" rather than "shall" makes
this choice to inform the Central Authority discretionary with
the party. Apparently, if the party decides for whatever reason
not to inform the other contracting party, there is no obligation
to do so under the MLAT.
In addition, the U.S.-Barbados MLAT provides that the contracting parties shall assist each other "to the extent permitted by
their respective laws in proceedings relating to the forfeiture of
the proceeds and instrumentalities of offenses."70 The U.S.-Bar68. MLAT U.S.-Barbados, supra note 55, art. 16(1).
69. Id. (emphasis added). Similar provisions are found in other MLATs. See
MLAT U.S.-Austria, supra note 55; MIAT U.S.-Hungary, supra note 55; MLAT U.S.-Korea, supra note 55; MLAT U.S.-Luxembourg, supra note 55; MIAT U.S.-Panama, supra
note 55. The MLATs between the United States and Austria, Barbados, Hungary, and
Luxembourg have been signed but await Senate confirmation.
70. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 16(2), 28 I.L.M. at 518.
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bados MLAT, however, provides that this assistance may include
action to immobilize the proceeds or instrumentalities temporarily, pending further proceedings. 7' Thus, there is no obligation under the U.S.-Barbados MLAT to restrain forfeitable assets
in order to prevent them from being removed from the territory.
This provision is wholly discretionary among the parties. Therefore, it is of little relative value when requiring assistance from
other countries in forfeiture proceedings. Cooperation under
the MLAT, pertaining to freezing assets located in another country's territory, is wholly illusory.
A substantially similar provision providing for the freezing
of assets within the discretion of the requested party is found in
the MLATs between the United States and Hungary, 72 the Republic of Korea,73 Luxembourg," the Phillippines, 5 Poland,7 6
Russia,7 7 and Trinidad and Tobago. 8
The MLAT between the United States and Australia is deficient on other grounds. Article 17 of this treaty requires assistance "to locate, trace, restrain, freeze, seize, forfeit, or confiscate
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime," but fails to include
a provision imposing any obligation on the parties to enforce
foreign forfeiture orders as required by Article 5(4) (b) of the
U.N. Drug Convention. 79 The MLAT between the United States
and Luxembourg ("U.S.-Luxembourg MLAT") makes the matter
discretionary among the parties. The U.S.-Luxembourg MLAT
provides that contracting parties may assist each other to give
effect to final decisions rendered in either state that require
forfeiting proceeds, objects, or instrumentalities of an offense."'
The Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in
71. Id.
72. See MLAT U.S.-Hungary, supra note 55, art. 17(2).
73. See MLAT U.S.-Korea, supra note 55, art. 17(2), 1993 WL 796842, at *4.
74. See MLAT U.S.-Luxembourg, supra note 55, art. 17(1).
75. See MLAT U.S.-Phillippines, supra note 55, art. 16(2).
76. See MLAT U.S.-Poland, supra note 55.
77. See Treaty Between the United States and Russia on Cooperation in Criminal
Law Matters, June 30, 1995, U.S.-Russ., art. 15(2), 1995 WL 831037 (entered into force
Feb. 5, 1996).
78. See MLAT U.S.-Trinidad, supra note 55, art. 16(2).
79. See MLAT U.S.-Australia, supra note 55. The following MLATs are silent on the
obligation of the parties to enforce a foreign judgment of forfeiture: the MLAT between the United States and Austria, Barbados, Canada, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Panama, the Phillippines, Poland, and Russia.
80. See MLAT U.S.-Luxembourg, supra note 55, art. 17(3).
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Criminal Matters"' is vaguely worded and non-specific regarding
the obligations of assistance imposed thereunder. Article 15 of
this convention provides that "[t]he parties shall assist each
other, to the extent permitted by their respective laws, in precautionary measures and measures for securing the proceeds, fruits,
and instrumentalities of the crime. '82 The Inter-American
MLAT does not explicitly require a party to submit to its competent authorities a foreign judgment of forfeiture for the purpose
of giving it effect in the requested state. Furthermore, neither of
the parties involved is required to enact domestic legislation for
that purpose.
While the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention requires parties to
assist one another in forfeiting drug proceeds and instrumentalities of narcotics trafficking, the MLAT between the United States
and Canada is limited to providing assistance to forfeit criminal
proceeds. Article XVII of this MLAT provides that:
1. The Central Authority of either party shall notify the Central Authority of the other party of proceeds of crime believed
to be located in the territory of the other party[; and]
2. The parties shall assist each other to the extent permitted
by their respective laws in proceedings related to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, restitution to the victims of
crime, and the collection of fines imposed as a sentence in a
criminal prosecution.8 3
This MLAT is silent on the duty to provide legal assistance to
forfeit instrumentalities of crime. Furthermore, no obligation to
enforce foreign orders of forfeiture is specified in this MLAT.
The MLAT between the United States and Hong Kong
("U.S.-Hong-Kong MLAT") is one of the few MLATs that conforms with the requirements imposed under the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention."4 Article 18(1) of the U.S.-Hong-Kong MLAT requires the parties to assist in the investigative stages of a forfeiture action. 5 Article 18(1) states that a requested party "shall,"
upon request, endeavor to ascertain whether any proceeds or in81. Inter-American MLAT, supra note 55.
82. Id. Other MLATs contain similarly worded provision. See MLAT U.S.-Austria,
supra note 55, art. 16; MLAT U.S.-Canada, supra note 55, art. 17(2), 1990 Can. T.S. at
24; MLAT U.S.-Panama, supra note 55, art. 14(2).
83. MLAT U.S.-Canada, supra note 55, art. 17, 1990 Can. T.S. at 24.
84. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6.
85. MLAT U.S.-Hong-Kong, supra note 55, art. 18(1).
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strumentalities of crime are located within its territory. If so, the
requested party is obliged to inform the requesting party. Additionally, Article 18(2) requires a party to take provisional measures to freeze or to seize suspected proceeds or instrumentalities
to prevent their disposal or transfer, pending a final determination by a court of the requested party.8 6 Finally, Article 18(3)
authorizes enforcement of a court forfeiture order in the re8 7
questing party.
The Agreement Between the United States and the Netherlands Regarding Mutual Cooperation in the Tracing, Freezing,
Seizure, and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of
Crime, and the Sharing of Forfeited Assets8 8 ("U.S.-Netherlands
MLAT") is by far the most comprehensive and detailed in setting
forth the obligations of the parties with respect to forfeiture.8 9 It
serves as a model mutual legal assistance agreement. Article 2
provides that the parties "shall" afford each other assistance in
the identification and tracing of proceeds and instrumentalities
of crime. 90 "Such assistance shall include any measure providing
and securing evidence as to the existence, location, movement,
nature, legal status or value of the ... property."'" Article 2 requires the parties to institute provisional measures, such as freezing and seizure, with respect to forfeitable property.9 2 Article 3
of the U.S.-Netherlands MLAT requires enforcement of foreign
forfeiture orders.9 3 It states that:
To the extent permitted by the respective domestic laws, the
parties shall, upon request, take all measures to enforce a forfeiture order of a court of the requesting party affecting proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, or property of
equivalent value, located within the territorial jurisdiction of
86. Id. art. 18(2).
87. Id.art. 18(3). Article 18(3) provides:
Where a request is made for assistance in securing the confiscation or forfeiture of proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, such assistance shall be given by
whatever means are appropriate. This may include enforcing an order made
by a court in the Requesting party or initiating or assisting in proceedings in
relation to the request.
Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See MLAT
Id.
Id. art. 2,
Id. art. 1,
Id. art. 2,
Id. art. 3,

U.S.-Netherlands, supra note 55.
1994
1994
1994
1994

WL
WL
WL
WL

524966,
524966,
524966,
524966,

at
at
at
at

1.
1.
1.
2.
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the requested party, or to initiate its own forfeiture proceed94
ings against such property.
The U.S.-Netherlands MLAT implicates the three types of legal
assistance imposed under the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
In summary, a review of MLATs on asset forfeiture reveals
that a substantial majority of the signatories to the 1988 U.N.
Drug Convention are not in compliance with the obligations imposed under the Convention to provide one another the widest
measure of mutual legal assistance.
III. U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1988 U.N.
DRUG CONVENTION
A. Domestic Money LaunderingLegislation95
The United States is in compliance with Article 3(1) (b) of
the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, which requires each party to
enact domestic money laundering legislation.9 6 Several questions remain, however, as to how aggressively federal prosecutors
have enforced the enacted provisions. In 1986, Congress enacted a comprehensive anti-money laundering scheme. The
Money Laundering Control Act 97 ("MLCA") makes laundering
proceeds derived from specified unlawful activity a federal
crime.98 By enacting federal legislation criminalizing the laundering of illicit proceeds, Congress was responding to both the
spiraling growth and pervasiveness of money laundering in the
United States, and the nexus between money laundering and or94. Id. art. 3, 1994 WL 524966, at 2; see United States v. Vacant Lot Known as Los
Morros, 885 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that court had subject matter jurisdiction over forfeiture of property located in United States based on criminal
acts committed in Netherlands). Jurisdiction was proper under three different treaties
and agreements to which the United States and the Netherlands are parties: (1) Treaty
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the United States and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands; (2) the Agreement Between the United States and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding Mutual Cooperation in the Tracing, Freezing,
Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Crime and the Sharing of
Forfeited Assets; and (3) United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Id. at 1331.
95. The sections on domestic and international money laundering are derived
partly from J. PAUST, M.C. BAssIOUNI, S. WILLIAMS, M. SCHARF,J. CURUL2, & B. ZAGARIS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1334-1338 (1996).
96. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
97. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994).
98. Id.
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ganized crime."9 The primary intent was to criminalize the "process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal
application of income, and then disguises that income to make it
appear legitimate.""' The MLCA also aimed to stem the flow of
illicit profits back to the criminal enterprise used to capitalize
criminal profits and to expand criminal activity. 1"'
The MLCA makes it a crime to engage knowingly in a financial transaction with the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity either "with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity," 10 2 or with the design of concealing the
"nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the [illicit]
proceeds."1'0 3 Sections 1956 (a) (1) (A) (i), the "promotion" provision, and (a) (1) (B) (i), the "concealment" provision, are aimed
at different activities: "the first at the practice of plowing back
proceeds of 'specified unlawful activity' to promote that activity,
99. See HOUSE COMM.
SESS.

16,

ACT, H.R.

T

99 '

CONG., 2D

REP.

No. 99-746

ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,

COMPREHENSIVE MONEY LAUNDERING PREVENTION

(1986).
100. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION:
IZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING

ORGAN-

7 (1984).

101. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, a chief sponsor of the senate bill, posited:
Money laundering permits the drug traffickers to evade taxes and to conduct
their operations and finance their drug networks behind a veil of secrecy. It
allows them to buy more drugs for resale, and to acquire the planes, boats,
front corporations they use to smuggle drugs into the United States.
Drug Money Laundering, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1" Sess. 7 (1985).
102. Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), (ii)
(1994). The Money Laundering Control Act ("MLCA") provides in relevant part:
(a) (1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with intent to . . . [violate] section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue
Code or 1986; . . . shall be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment ....
Id.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The MCLA provides in relevant part who:
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law
shall be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment ....
Id; see JIMMY GURULE, COMPLEX CRIMINAL LITIGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG ENTERPRISES
AND ORGANIZED CRIME

105-139 (1996) & 1998 Comprehensive Supp. (discussing MLCA

and statutory schemes).
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the second at hiding the proceeds of the activity."' 4 Section
1956(c) (7) defines the term specified unlawful activity as encompassing a broad array of statutorily designated felony offenses.1 °5
As defined in the statute, "specified unlawful activity" includes
bank fraud, 10 6 conducting an illegal gambling business and interstate transmission of wagering information, 0 7 mail fraud, 10 8
wire fraud,'0 9 a violation of the Hobbs Act," 0 and narcotics trafficking."' 1
B. InternationalMoney Laundering

12

The MLCA prohibits international money laundering. 1 '
104. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); see United States v.
Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1080 (11 " Cir. 1994); United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 535 (6"
Cir. 1993), rev'd in part, United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139 (6"' Cir.), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1246 (1996).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (A) (defining specified unlawful activity as any act
that would constitute "racketeering activity" under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994)).
Section 1961(1), in turn, designates numerous felony offenses that would support a
finding that the defendant engaged in a pattern of "racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (1). Section 1956(c) (7) (d) details other federal felony offenses that constitute
specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (d); see United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d
1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1994).
106. United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1440 (9" Cir. 1995); United States v.
Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1994).
107. United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9"' Cir. 1995); United States v.
Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1077 (11" Cir. 1994); United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 346
(1" Cir. 1994).
108. United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1099 (6t' Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 691
(1996); Savage, 67 F.3d at 1440; United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119, 122 (6"' Cir. 1994);
United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 193 (5"' Cir. 1994); United States v. Paramo, 998
F.2d 1212, 1216-18 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 121 (1994).
109. United States v. Habhab, 132 F.3d 410, 414 (8t' Cir. 1997); United States v.
Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8h' Cir. 1995).
110. United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9"' Cir. 1991).
111. United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7"' Cir. 1991).
112. This subsection was adapted in part from PAUST, supra note 95, at 1335-1338.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) provides in relevant part:
(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United
States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the
United States from or through a place outside the United States(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
or
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer ... is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity or
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Section 1956(a) (2) of the MLCA is "'designed to illegalize international money laundering transactions,' and 'covers situations
in which money is being laundered ... by transferring it out of
1 14
the United States."
Section 1956(f) explicitly recognizes extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct prohibited by this section if a U.S. citizen, or
non-citizen if the conduct is in the United States and the conduct involves funds exceeding US$10,000. 15 At the same time,
one U.S. circuit court has ruled that the international money
laundering statute does not criminalize the transfer of funds taking place entirely outside of the United States. 11 6 The transfer of
a monetary instrument or funds must occur between the territory of the United States and another country.1 "'
In United States v. Kramer, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
defendant's conviction for money laundering based on the
transfer of US$9.5 million from Switzerland to Luxembourg.1 1
The court rejected the government's argument that the statute
was satisfied because the transfer of money in Europe was part of
a continuing transaction that originated in the United States.
The court opined that the statute does not make money launder(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a'fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of
the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (1994).
114. United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting S. REP.
No. 99-433 (1986)); see United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 1993) ("In
subsection (a) (2), Congress outlawed the physical transportation or wire transfer of
tainted funds across United States borders."), rev'd in pan, United States v. Reed, 77
F.3d 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1246 (1996).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f). This section provides that:
there is extraterritorial jurisdiction .. .if
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United
States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or monetary
instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.
Id.
116. See United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
convictions for international money laundering involving transfer of funds from Austrian bank accounts back to United States); United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330,
1334 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding conviction for international money laundering for
transporting money from United States to Brazil).
117. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1335.
118. United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996).
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ing a continuing offense. Instead, the court found that the legislative history reveals that each transaction or transfer of money
constitutes a separate offense. Because the defendant was involved in only one transaction, and that transaction occurred
outside of the United States, the defendant's conviction could
not be upheld on that basis.' 1 9
The international money laundering statute is structured in
many respects like the domestic money laundering provision.
Both statutes contain a promotion and concealment provision.
Sections 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and (a) (2) (A) prohibit the use of
monies intended to "promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. ' 120 Similarly, both sections 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) and
or to dis(a) (2) (B) (i) criminalize conduct intended to conceal
12 1
activity.
unlawful
specified
of
proceeds
the
guise
The international and domestic money laundering statutes,
however, differ in two significant respects. First, the domestic
money laundering statute requires proof that the defendant engaged in a "financial transaction" with some form of unlawful
proceeds and that the financial transaction was intended to "promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity" or was
designed to "conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." 122 For purposes of the MLCA, the term
"financial transaction" is a term of art. "[T]ransaction" is defined in section 1956(c) (3) and includes the "purchase, sale,
1 2
load, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition.
The term "financial transaction" is defined in section 1956(c) (4)
and means:
a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or
other means or involving one or more monetary instruments,
which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, or a transaction involving the use of a financial instituintion which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
24
degree.'
or
way
any
in
commerce
foreign
or
terstate
119. Id. at 1072-73.
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), (a)(2)(A) (1994).
121. See id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B)(i).
122. Id. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), (a) (1) (B) (i).
123. Id. § 1956(c) (3).
124. Id. § 1956(c) (4).
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Proof of a financial transaction is an indispensable element of
the offense of domestic money laundering.
The international money laundering provision, on the
other hand, does not require a showing that the defendant engaged in a financial transaction. Section 1956(a) (2) (A) punishes the mere transportation, transmission, or transfer of monetary instruments of funds extraterritorially with the intent to promote the specified unlawful activity. Likewise, section
1956(a) (2) (B) (i) proscribes international money transfers knowing that the monies involved represent some form of unlawful
activity, and the transportation, transmission, or transfer was
designed to conceal or to disguise the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Thus, a person could violate either the promotion or concealment provision of section 1956(a) (2) without actually participating in an unlawful transaction as defined by section 1956(c). Furthermore, the federal courts construing the
domestic money laundering statute have emphatically stated that
the mere transportation of illicit proceeds does not constitute a
financial transaction within the meaning of section
1956(a) (1). 1 2 5 In contrast, pursuant to section 1956(a) (2), the
transportation of monies, coupled with the requisite intent or
mens rea, would support a conviction for international money
1 26
laundering.
The second major distinction involves section 1956(a) (2)
(A), the international money laundering promotion provision. 127 The funds transported with the intent to promote unlawful activity need not be derived from specified unlawful activity. In other words, there is no requirement that the funds involved first be generated by unlawful activity. The statute
proscribes transporting, transmitting, or transferring funds overseas, even if those funds were lawfully derived, if the intent was
12
to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 1
In United States v. Piervinanzi,129 the Second Circuit explained the distinction between the domestic and international
money laundering statutes:
125. See United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 143 (6' Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2504 (1996); United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10lh Cir. 1994).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1994).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (A).
128. Id.
129. United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Sections 1956(a) (1), the domestic money laundering statute,
penalizes financial transactions that "involv[e] ...the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." The provision requires
first, that the proceeds of specified unlawful activity be generated, and second, that the defendant, knowing the proceeds
to be tainted, conduct[s], or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction with these proceeds with the intent to promote
specified unlawful activity. By contrast, section 1956(a)(2)
contains no requirement that "proceeds" first be generated
by unlawful activity, followed by a financial transaction with
those proceeds, for criminal liability to attach. Instead, it penalizes an overseas transfer "with the intent
to promote the
''1
carrying on of specified unlawful activity." 0
In United States v. Hamilton, the Fifth Circuit added:
The two provisions seek to attack two different types of criminal conduct. Section 1956(a) (1) specifically refers to "transactions" involving "proceeds of some form of unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Section 1956(a)(2), on the
other hand, prohibits the international "transport[ation],
transmit[al], or transfer[al] [of] .. .a monetary instrument
or funds" in cases where such funds are intended to promote
unlawful activities. A person could, in effect, violate section
1956(a)(2) without actually participating in an unlawful
transaction as defined by section 1956(a) (1). For example, a
foreign drug cartel might transfer proceeds from a legitimate
business enterprise into a bank account in the United States.
Such a transfer would not violate section 1956(a) (1) because
the proceeds would not represent "proceeds of unlawful activities." Under section 1956(a) (2), however, the same transfer
would be criminalized if the legitimate proceeds of that bank
account were intended to provide the capital necessary for
expanding a drug enterprise in the United States.'
The United States appears to be in compliance with its obligations imposed under Article 3(1) (b) of the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention. The Convention, however, requires more than the
enactment of laws criminalizing money laundering. In order to
impact international drug trafficking successfully, the Convention requires that these money laundering statutes be aggressively enforced. A close examination of both federal district
court and circuit court decisions reveal that there have been few
130. Id. at 679-80.
131. United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1991).
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federal prosecutions brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2), the
international money laundering provision, when the laundered
funds were derived from drug trafficking. Instead, the emphasis
has been on domestic rather than international money laundering prosecutions. The anti-money laundering statutes have not
been aggressively utilized to prosecute persons involved in transporting or transferring illicit drug proceeds "from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States"
with the intent to promote the carrying on of drug trafficking
nature, location,
activity or with the design to conceal the
1 32
source, or ownership of the illicit proceeds.
Over the last ten years, there have been eighty-eight reported federal cases that involved a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a) (2). Of these cases, only twenty-three involved the
laundering of illicit drug proceeds. 13 Stated another way, in
only twenty-three cases did the "specified unlawful activity,"
which served as the basis for the money laundering convictions,
constitute drug trafficking. When placed in perspective, twentythree cases over a ten-year period translates into less than three
international drug money laundering cases per year.134 Consid132. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1994).
133. See United States v. Myers, 117 F.3d 1423 (8h Cir. 1997); United States v.
h
Parrado, 99 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Mir, 52 F.3d 335 (91 Cir. 1995);
t
United States v. Claudio, 44 F.3d 10 (1 Cir. 1995); United States v. Diaz-Cano, 41 F.3d
1514 (9" Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (91h Cir. 1994); United States
h
v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556 (81 Cir.
th
1992); United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415 (11 Cir. 1992); United States v. Beddow,
th
th
957 F.2d 1330 (6 Cir. 1992); United States v. Ryce, 944 F.2d 903 (4 Cir. 1991); United
h
States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346 (9" Cir. 1991); United States v. Kimball, 884 F.2d 1274
(9 t ' Cir. 1989); Villegas v. United States, No. CV-96-1418, 1997 WL 35510 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 1997); Villegas v. United States, No. CV-96-1419, 1997 WL 35523 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,
1997); Mouawad v. United States, No. CV-96-2609, 1996 WL 518080 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30,
1996); United States v. Rivera, No. CR-89-00031-04, 1992 WL 135231 (E.D.N.Y. June 3,
1992); Guapacha v. United States, No. CV-92-5456, 1992 WL 391378 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
1992); United States v. Hanna, 942 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y 1996); United States v.
Ailemen, 893 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Christunas, 830 F. Supp.
394 (E.D. Mich. 1993); United States v. Sierra-Garcia, 760 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
United States v. Parramore, 720 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
134. In fact, no more than five federal international money laundering decisions
were reported in any one year. There were five cases reported in both 1992 and 1995.
Of course, there may be other possible explanations for the low number of federal cases
citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). Perhaps the defendant plead guilty to a section
1956(a) (2) count or entered a guilty plea to some other count in exchange for an
agreement to dismiss the international money laundering charge, and these convictions
were never appealed or challenged on a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In
such a case, no reported case opinion would appear. At the same time, the dearth of
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ering that there are ninety-three U.S. Attorney's offices in the
country, this data suggests that during this period a substantial
majority of the federal prosecutor's offices failed to prosecute
even one international drug money laundering case.' 35 Additionally, federal prosecutions of professional money launderers,
who launder money for major drug cartels, are even more
rare. 1 36 This sparse record of international drug money laundering prosecutions provides compelling evidence that section
1956(a) (2) has not been aggressively enforced.
Finally, while there have been numerous prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1), the domestic money laundering
statute, those prosecutions have seldom been directed at major
international drug trafficking organizations. In fact, in many instances section 1956(a) (1) has been charged in cases wholly unrelated to drug trafficking.13
In other cases, the amount of
drug money involved in the laundering activity was relatively
small.

138

international money laundering cases is illuminating, evidencing the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a) (2) is seldom used by federal prosecutors.
135. In contrast, research of Federal Circuit Court of Appeals cases revealed that
in 1997 alone, there were over 90 reported cases involving domestic money laundering
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1994) (defendant convicted of attempting to transport US$186,000 outside United States to Colombia with
intent to disguise or conceal its nature, source, ownership, or control); Beddow, 957 F.2d
at 1330 (defendant convicted of transporting US$47,000 in cash and traveler's checks
derived from illegal drug sales out of country when he traveled to Brazil).
137. Section 1956(a) has often been used where the underlying "specified unlawful activity" is fraud, rather than drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Habhab, 132
F.3d 410, 414 ( 8 th Cir. 1997) (underlying specified unlawful activity was wire fraud);
United States v. Nattier, 127 F.3d 655, 658-59 (8 h Cir. 1997) (affirming money laundering conviction for laundering embezzled bank funds); United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d
447, 451-52 ( 8 th Cir. 1995) (charging wire fraud as underlying specified unlawful activity); United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1416 (9 tb Cir.) (basing money laundering
conviction scheme to skim gambling casino chips), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995);
United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 346 (1 Cir. 1994) (charging illegal gambling as
underlying specified unlawful activity); United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d 1075, 1077 (11P h
Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 91 (5"' Cir. 1994) (basing
money laundering conviction on mailing false auto theft report that caused insurance
company to mail check to satisfy lien on vehicle); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d
1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993) (charging money laundering based on deposit of embezzled
tax refund checks into defendant's bank account); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d
1068, 1075 (9"h Cir. 1991) (granting money laundering conviction based on deposit of
US$3,000 of bribery proceeds into defendant's bank account). But see United States v.
Otis, 127 F.3d 829, 838 (9 th Cir. 1997) (affirming money laundering conviction where
defendant intended to assist Cali cartel in laundering its drug money).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191-92 (5"h Cir. 1997)
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While Article 3(b) (1) of the Convention imposes an obligation on the parties to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention to enact
domestic anti-money laundering legislation, it further imposes a
duty to enforce such legislation. Based on the number of section 1956(a) (2) prosecutions over the past ten years, coupled
with the relatively few cases directed at persons laundering funds
for major drug enterprises, it is highly questionable whether the
United States is in compliance with this second duty imposed by
Article 3(b)(1).
C. Domestic Asset ForfeitureLegislation Intended to Foster
InternationalCooperation
1. Forfeiting Property Located Abroad.3 9
In 1992, the MLCA was amended to extend U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction to properties located outside the United
States. 4 ° Prior to 1992, 28 U.S.C. § 1355 simply provided that
district courts had jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings commenced pursuant to the laws of the United States. A district
court, however, was not authorized to issue process against property located outside its district. "This limitation hindered the effectiveness of the forfeiture laws, as some courts concluded that
district courts lacked in rem jurisdiction in actions where the
property was located within the United States but outside the
district in which the forfeiture action was brought. ''14' Of
course, the argument that the district court lacked in rem jurisdiction applied with even more force when the property was located outside the United States.
This deficiency in the forfeiture law was cured by recent
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1355, which extend in rem jurisdic(basing money laundering convictions on purchase of two vehicles from money derived
from drug trafficking); United States v. Laurenzana, 113 F.3d 689, 692 ( 7 th Cir. 1997)
(convicting defendant money laundering based on payment of US$2,500 cash bond to
secure bail of co-conspirator); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir.)
(reversing money laundering convictions where defendant openly purchased two
automobiles with proceeds from drug trafficking), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991).
139. This subsection is derived in part from JIMMY GURULE & SANDRA GUERRA, THE
LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE 342-44 (1998) [hereinafter ASSET FORFEITURE].
140. Anti-Money Laundering Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b) (1994).
141. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts (Meza or De Castro),
63 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1995).
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tion to property located in a foreign country. 142 Section
1355(b) (1) enlarges the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, authorizing forfeiture of property located in another
country. 14 Thus, drug dealers can no longer evade U.S. forfeiture laws by merely depositing drug proceeds in a bank account
in another country. The federal courts may order forfeiture of
property forfeitable under the laws of the United States regardless of its locus. Despite its importance, there are only two reported federal cases discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b) (1), which
suggests that this provision has not been frequently used by federal prosecutors.
In United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts (Meza or
De Castro),14 4 the court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b) (1) to property located in a foreign country. 145 In All Funds, federal authorities targeted funds in several bank accounts at various financial
institutions in London, England, believed to represent the proceeds of an international drug trafficking and money laundering
organization headed by Jose Santacruz Londono. Based on a request made through the U.S. Department of Justice, British authorities cooperated and obtained a court order from England's
High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, restraining the
suspect bank accounts.' 4 6
The U.S. government filed a civil forfeiture action in federal
district court seeking forfeiture of the funds. The district court
denied the claimant's motion to dismiss the forfeiture complaint
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b). The amendment to section 1335 added a new part (b),
which reads, in pertinent part:
(b) (1) A forfeiture action or proceeding may be brought in(A) the district court for the district in which any of the acts or omissions
giving rise to the forfeiture occurred, or
(B) any other district where venue for the forfeiture action or proceeding is
specifically provided for in section 1395 of this title or any other statute.
(2) Whenever property subject to forfeiture under the laws of the United
States is located in a foreign country, or has been detained or seized pursuant
to legal process or competent authority of a foreign government, an action or
proceeding for forfeiture may be brought [in the district court for the district
in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred], or
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Id.
143. Id.
144. All Funds on Deposit In Any Account (Meza or De Castro), 63 F.3d 148.
145. Id. at 152.
146. See id. at 149-50 (discussing receipt of Queen's Bench Division order of March
18, 1994 in In re: JL and Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986).
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on the ground that the district court lacked in rem jurisdiction
over the funds because it lacked constructive control over the
funds. The court ordered forfeiture of the funds pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6).147
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court. The Second Circuit reaffirmed the principle that
"in order to institute and perfect proceedings in rem, . . . the

thing should be actually or constructively within the reach of the
Court," and posited that this rule equally applies to property located in another country. 148 The court held that "in order to
initiate a forfeiture proceeding against property located in a foreign country, the property must be within the actual or construc1 49
tive control of the district in which the action is commenced.'
The court concluded that the U.S. government had met its burden by demonstrating that the British government had agreed to
turn over at least a portion of the seized funds to the United
States, thereby vesting the district court with the requisite constructive control over the funds. 5 °
The second reported opinion involves the retroactive application of section 1355(b) (1). In United States v. Certain Funds at
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp.,' 5 the U.S. government sought civil in rem forfeiture of certain bank accounts alleged to contain the proceeds of a heroin smuggling operation
from Hong Kong to New York.' 52 Following the acquittals of the
owners of the accounts on criminal drug charges in Hong Kong,
the Hong Kong government immediately froze the assets at the
request of the U.S. government. 5 The United States then filed
District of New
a federal asset forfeiture action in the Eastern
1 54
Kong.
Hong
in
held
York against properties
The Second Circuit permitted the retroactive application of
the 1992 amendment that gives district courts jurisdiction to
hear civil in rem forfeiture cases involving properties located
147. Id. at 152.
148. Id. (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,
63 (1993) (citations omitted)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 154.
151. United States v. Certain Funds at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corp., 96 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1996).
152. Id. at 22.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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outside the United States.1 55 The court found that the provision
did not create any new rights or legal consequences for past conduct, and, thus, it could be applied retroactively.' 5 6 The court
also rejected the defendant's asserted ex post facto Clause argument, finding that the statute gives the courts jurisdiction to
hear civil forfeiture cases and that7 these are not "penal" for pur15
poses of the ex post facto clause.
2. Forfeiting Drug Proceeds From Other
Countries Found in
1 58
the United States
With regard to real or personal property found within the
United States and derived from, or traceable to, the proceeds of
drug crimes in other countries, the United States may file a civil
forfeiture action pursuant to the MLCA. 1 91 18 U.S.C.
§ 981 (a) (1) (B) authorizes forfeiture of:
[a] ny property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of the
United States, constituting, derived from or traceable to, any
proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from an offense
against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance ....
within whose jurisdiction such offense would be punishable
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and
which would be punishable under the laws of the United
States by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if such
act or activity constituting the offense against the foreign nation had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United
States.' 6 0
This provision permits the civil forfeiture of property located in the United States that is derived from, or traceable to, a
155. Id. at 27.
156. Id. at 23-24.
157. Id. at 25-26. The court found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Usery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), had "clarified and limited its prior holding
in Austin" to apply only to the Excessive Fines Clause. United States v. Certain Funds at
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 96 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1996). The court
in Usery held that civil forfeitures are not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Usery, 518 U.S. at 273. Likewise, the Second Circuit found that if the civil
forfeiture statutes "are not penal or criminal, then there cannot be a 'substantial doubt'
as to their compatibility with the Ex Post Facto Clause." Certain Funds, 96 F.3d at 26.
158. This subsection is adapted in part from AsSEr FORFEITURE, supra note 139, at
344-45.
159. 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(1)(B) (1994).
160. Id.
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violation of the drug laws of another country involving the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of controlled substances. 16 ' The drug violation in another country, however,
must be one that is punishable by more than one year imprisonment in that country, and that would have been punishable for
such a term had the offense occurred in the United States. In
other words, the non-U.S. drug offense giving rise to the forfeiture must constitute a felony in both the foreign country and
United States. Additionally, section 981 (a) (1) (B) is limited to
forfeiture of drug proceeds, or property traceable to the drug
offense, and does not extend to property that was used to facilitate the violation of the countries drug law. Thus, for example,
an aircraft located in the United States that was purchased with
drug proceeds derived from a drug crime in another country
would be forfeitable under section 981 (a) (1) (B), while an aira drug traffickcraft similarly located that was used to facilitate
16 2
not.
would
country
another
in
offense
ing
Section 981 (a) (1) (B) would also enable the United States
to assist other countries in forfeiting property located in the
United States that was derived from criminal acts committed in
the territory of those countries. 1 63 This provision would appear
to implement Article 5(4) (a) (i) of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, which provides:
(4) (a) Following a request made pursuant to this article by
another party having jurisdiction over an offense established
in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, the party in whose
territory proceeds, property, instrumentalities ... referred to
in paragraph 1 of this article are situated shall:
(i) submit the request to its competent authorities for the
purpose of obtaining an order of6 4confiscation and, if such
order is granted, give effect to it.'
The U.S. civil forfeiture action of drug proceeds in another
country is aided by 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (i) (3) and (4), which permit
the use of forfeiture orders and criminal convictions from other
countries in domestic forfeiture proceedings. 16 1 Section
981 (i) (3) authorizes the admission into evidence of a certified
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(4)(a)(i), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
18 U.S.C. § 981 (i) (3), (4) (1994).
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order orjudgment of forfeiture by a court of competent jurisdiction in another country concerning the property that is the subject of forfeiture under section 981 (a) (1) (B).' 6 6 Moreover, section 981 (i) (3) provides that such certified order or judgment of
forfeiture, "when admitted into evidence, shall constitute probable cause that the property forfeited by such order orjudgment
preof forfeiture is subject to forfeiture and creates a rebuttable
67
sumption of the forfeitablility of such property."'
Section 981 (i) (4) admits into evidence a certified order or
judgment of conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction in
another country concerning the unlawful drug activity giving
rise to forfeiture under section 981 (a) (1) (B). 6 ' Thus, non-U.S.
judgments of conviction for a substantive drug offense are admissible into evidence. The statute further provides that "[s] uch
certified order or judgment of conviction, when admitted into
evidence, creates a rebuttable presumption that the unlawful
drug activity giving rise to forfeiture under this section has occurred."' 6 9 The forfeiture statutes specifically granting the
courts jurisdiction over forfeitures based on non-U.S. criminal
166. Id. § 981(i) (3).
167. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (i) (3) would appear to constitute substantial compliance
with the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, Article 5(4) (a) (ii), which requires that a party
give legal effect to a foreign judgment of forfeiture. Article 5(4) (a) (ii) provides that a
party submit to its competent authorities, "with a view to giving effect to it to the extent
requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting party .... in so far as it
relates to proceeds, property, instrumentalities . . .situated in the territory of the requested party." U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(4) (a) (ii), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (i) (4).
169. Id. Sections 981(a) (1) (B), (i)(3), and (i)(4) appear to implement the requirements of Article 5(4)(a) of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. See United States v.
Vacant Land Known as Los Morros, 885 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (S.D. Cal. 1995) ("In enacting § 981 (a) (1) (B) and subsection (i) (3), Congress intended to provide a statutory
means of complying with the United Nations' treaty obligations."). Article 5(4) (a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Following a request made pursuant to this article by another party having
jurisdiction over an offense established in accordance with article 3, paragraph
1, the party in whose territory proceeds, property, instrumentalities .. .are
situated shall:
(i) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order or confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect to it;
or
(ii) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the
extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting party in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, in so far as it relates to proceeds,
property, instrumentalities ... situated in the territory of the requested party.
U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 504.
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acts enable federal prosecutors to assist in international forfeitures. Unfortunately sections 981(a) (1) (B), 981(a) (i) (3), and
170
981 (a) (i) (4) have seldom been used by federal prosecutors.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE 1988 UN. DRUG CONVENTION
THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL
ASSET SHARING
A. InternationalCourt of Justice
The effectiveness of the U.N. Drug Convention is directly
dependent on party compliance with the duties and-obligations
set forth therein. The laudable goals enumerated in the Preamble to the Convention will never be realized if parties are free to
ignore, at will, their obligations under the Convention. At the
same time, there is little incentive for parties to comply if enforcement of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention is never sought.
The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention sets forth two procedural
routes for settling legal disputes relating to the interpretation or
application of the Convention. First, Article 32(1) encourages
settlement of disputes by "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of their own choice. 1 7 ' Second,
pursuant to Article 32 (2), the parties consent to having disputes
resolved by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or the
"Court"), when legal matters cannot be resolved through the
means provided by Article 32(1).172 Article 32(2) of the Convention states that "[a]ny such dispute which cannot be settled in
the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 of this article shall be referred, at the request of any one of the State parties to the dispute, to the International Court of Justice for decision."' 17 3 Article 32(4) qualifies the jurisdiction of the ICJ.' 7 4 Article 32(4) of
the Convention states:
Each State, at the time of signature or ratification, acceptance
170. There is only one reported federal opinion discussing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 981(a) (1) (B), (i)(3). See Vacant Land Known as Los Morros, 885 F. Supp. at 1331.
There are no reported federal opinions citing 18 U.S.C. § 981 (i) (4).
171. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 32(1), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
172. Id. art. 32(1), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
173. Id. art. 32(2), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
174. Id. art. 32(4), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
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or approval of this Convention or accession thereto ... may
declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2
. . of this article. The other parties shall not be bound by
with respect to any party having made such a
paragraph 2...
1 75
declaration.
*

Thus, unless a party has declared that it is not bound by Article
32(2), it consents to the jurisdiction of the ICJ on legal matters
of interpretation and application of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 176 It was created by the U.N. Charter 17 7 and by the Statute
of the Court, which was made an integral part of the U.N. Charter. 17' The Court is comprised of fifteen judges elected by a majority of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. 1 79 Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter obliges each member of the
United Nations to comply with a decision of the ICJ in any case
In the event that a party fails to perform
to which it is a party.'8
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered
by the Court, "the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."' 8 ' Thus, in appropriate cases, the Security Council
may impose economic sanctions for failure to comply with a
judgment of the ICJ.
As outlined in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, the ICJ
may properly assert jurisdiction in three different scenarios.
175. Id.
176. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92. Article 7 of the U.N. Charter establishes the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or the "Court") as a principal organ of the United
Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 7.

177. Id. arts. 7(1), 36(3), 92-96.
178. Both the U.N. Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice
were signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945. Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 16, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. After the
election of the Court's first members, the new Court met for the first time at the Hague
on April 1, 1946. The ICJ has therefore been in existence over fifty years. See Robert Y.

Jennings, The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 493
(1995).
179. ICJ Statute, supra note 178, arts. 3-4, 59 Stat. at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179-80
(describing number and selection ofjudges of ICJ).
180. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(1) ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court ofJustice in any case to which it is a
party.").
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
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First, states can voluntarily bring a specific dispute between them
to the court on an ad hoc basis. Second, treaties and conventions, including the U.N. Charter, can explicitly refer matters to
the ICJ through their dispute resolution provisions. Third, state
parties can accept the general jurisdiction of the court over all
issues arising under international law.1 8 2 The second basis ofjurisdiction is referred to as "compulsory jurisdiction." 'Jurisdiction becomes compulsory when a provision of a bilateral or multilateral treaty stipulates that the ICJ will resolve disputes." '8 3
The ICJ has jurisdiction over legal disputes related to the
1988 U.N. Drug Convention under the compulsory jurisdiction
theory. As previously discussed, pursuant to Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the ICJ, the Court has jurisdiction over matters "specifically provided for in .. . treaties and conventions in force." '8 4
The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, Article 32(2), specifically provides that any "dispute which cannot be settled in the manner
prescribed [by Article 32 (1)] ... shall be referred, at the request
of any one of the State parties to the dispute, to the International Court of Justice for decision." '8 5
Because the Court's jurisdiction properly extends to disputes under the Convention, enforcement should be sought
through the ICJ. Thus, for example, a party to the Convention
could, and should, file a legal action with the ICJ against certain
182. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudenceof the International
Court ofJustice on NationalCourts, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 435, 440 (1996). Article 36
of the ICJ Statute states in relevant part:
(1) The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to
it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force.
(2) The state parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation; and
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
ICJ Statute, supra note 178, art. 36, 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186-87.
183. See H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the InternationalCourt ofJustice Is
Dependent upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1479, 1491 (1997).
184. ICJ Statute, supra note 178, art. 36(1), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186.
185. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 32(2), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
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major drug-producing or major drug-transit countries, e.g., Mexico, Colombia, or Bolivia, claiming that they have not complied
with the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. A declaratory judgment
finding non-compliance with the Convention issued by the ICJ
would carry significant legal consequences towards eventual
compliance. Article 94 of the U.N. Charter provides that
"[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case
to which it is a party." '8 6 Failure to adhere to an ICJ judgment
would constitute a violation of the U.N. Charter, specifically Article 94. Furthermore, treaty law is part of U.S. law.1 87 Finally,
disregarding an ICJjudgment violates principles of customary international law. "One such principle holds that treaties in force
shall be observed."1 88
Additionally, such a decision, having been rendered by an
impartial and independent international tribunal, would likely
receive the broad support of the international community. This
adverse ruling could be used to pressure the offending nation
into taking constructive steps towards compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, in the extreme case, where government
officials have not only failed to comply with the express terms of
the Convention, but also have actually facilitated or condoned
narcotics trafficking and money laundering within their territory, the complainant-party might seek recourse with the U.N.
Security Council.1 8 9 The authority of the Security Council could
be brought to bear on the offending nation to force compliance.
Pursuant to the Security Council's chapter VII powers, 190 the
non-complying party could suffer Security Council sanctions. 9 1
186. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
187. It should be noted that Article VI(2) of the U.S. Constitution establishes that
"all Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI(2). A claim of non-compliance with the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention is thus actionable in U.S. federal court.
188. Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
189. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
190. The U.N. Security Council's authority to impose sanctions emanates from
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Article 39 of Chapter VII provides: "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
191. Id. Pursuant to Article 41, the Security Council may decide what measures
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At the very least, any adverse ruling that a party is not in compliance would send a powerful message that the Convention will be
enforced and that parties will not be permitted simply to ignore
the duties and obligations imposed thereunder.
This approach is certainly more preferable than the current
situation where every year the United States threatens to "decertify" a country for non-compliance with 22 U.S.C. § 2291h of the
Foreign Assistance Act.19 2 Unlike a decision by the ICJ, the certification process is a unilateral action by the United States. As
such, it may not be perceived as impartial in nature. The support of the international community is far from guaranteed. Finally, if the United States does not have outstanding foreign aid
commitments with the "decertified" party, the threat of withholding foreign assistance will not motivate compliance.
Unfortunately, the United States has compromised its ability
to seek treaty compliance through the ICJ. When signing the
1988 U.N. Drug Convention, the United States declared that it
does not consider itself bound by Article 32(2) of the Convention. 193 Consequently, pursuant to Article 32(4), when a party
declares that it is not bound by Article 32(2), other parties to the
Convention shall not be bound by paragraph 2 with respect to
any party having made such a declaration.1 94 Thus, the Court is
deprived of jurisdiction under the compulsory jurisdiction theory because the ICJ may assert jurisdiction only if both parties
not involving the use of armed force should be employed to maintain or to restore
peace and security. These measures include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." If the Security Council considers that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or have proved inadequate, "it may take such [additional] action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international .peace and security," including "demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations." Id. art. 41.
192. See supra note 53. and accompanying text (discussing 22 U.S.C. § 2291h and
certification process).
193. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6. Recall that Article 32(4) permits each
state, at the time of signature or ratification, acceptance, or approval of the U.N Drug
Convention or accession thereto, to declare whether it considers itself bound by paragraph 2 of Article 32, which implicates the Court's jurisdiction under the compulsory
jurisdiction theory. At the time of signature, the United States declared: "Pursuant to
article 32(4), the United States of America shall not be bound by article 32(2)." Id. art.
32, 28 I.L.M. at 525.
194. Id. art. 32(4), 28 I.L.M. at 525.
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consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. 19 5 Of course, it is highly
unlikely that any party alleged to be in non-compliance-the
major drug-producing or major drug-transit countries-will consent to jurisdiction. Finally, numerous other parties have exempted themselves from Article 32(2) and the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 1 6 Several of these countries are major drug195. ICJ Statute, supra note 178, art. 36(2), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186.
196. The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention reveals that the following parties declared
themselves not bound by Article 32(2) of the Convention at the time of signature, ratification, accession, acceptance approval, or formal confirmation: Algeria ("The People's
Democratic Republic of Algeria does not consider itself bound by the provisions of
article 32, paragraph 2, the compulsory referral of any dispute of the International
Court of Justice"); Bahrain ("The State of Bahrain, by the ratification of this Convention, does not consider itself bound by paragraph (2) of article 32 in connection with
the obligations to refer the settlement of the dispute relating to the interpretation or
application of this Convention to the International Court of Justice"); Brunei Darnssalam ("In accordance with article 32 of the Conventi6n Brunei Darussalam hereby
declares it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 and 3 of the said article 32");
China ("Under the Article 32, paragraph 4, China does not consider itself bound by
paragraph 2 and 3 of that article"); Cuba ('The Government of the Republic of Cuba
declares that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 32, paragraphs
2 and 3, and that disputes which arise between the parties should be settled by negotiation through diplomatic channel"); France ("The Government of the French Republic
does not consider itself bound by the provision of article 32, paragraph 2, and declares
that any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention which
cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 of the said article may not
be referred to the International Court of Justice unless all the parties to the dispute
agree thereto"); Iran ("The Government furthermore wishes to make a reservation to
article 32, paragraphs 2 and 3, since it does not consider itself bound to compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and feels that any dispute arising between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention
should be resolved through direct negotiations by diplomatic means"); Lebanon ("The
Government of the Lebanese Republic does not consider itself bound by the provisions
of article 32, paragraph 2, and declares that disputes relating to the interpretation or
application of the Convention which are not settled by the means prescribed in paragraph 1 of that article shall be referred to the International Court of Justice only with
the agreement of all of the parties to the dispute'); Malaysia ("The Government of
Malaysia does not consider itself bound by paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 32 of the said
Convention, wherein if there should arise between two or more parties a dispute and
such dispute cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 of article 32 of
the Convention, Malaysia is not bound to refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice for decision"); Peru ("In accordance with the provisions of article 32, paragraph
4, Peru declares, on signing the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, that it does not consider itself bound by article 32, paragraphs
2 and 3, since, in respect of this Convention, it agrees to the referral of disputes to the
International Court of Justice only if all the parties, and not just one, agree to such a
procedure"); Saudi Arabia ("The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not regard itself bound
by article 32, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention"); Singapore ("The Republic of
Singapore declares, in pursuance of article 32, paragraph 3 of the Convention that it
will not be bound by the provisions of article 32, paragraphs 2 and 3"); Turkey ("Pursu-
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producing or major drug-transit countries, for example, Algeria,
1 97
Cuba, Iran, Peru, and Turkey.
98
B. InternationalAsset Sharing

Compliance with the obligations imposed under the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention could be encouraged through international asset sharing. 9 9 Sharing the proceeds of forfeited assets
among nations enhances international cooperation by creating
an incentive for countries to work together in combating international drug trafficking. Article 5(b) (ii) of the Convention
contemplates that parties may enter into agreements on a regular or case-by-case basis sharing the proceeds or property derived
from drug trafficking and money laundering.2 0 0 One commentator has noted that: "[s]uch asset-sharing agreements may be
among the most potent inducements to international cooperation and may result in significant enhancement of law enforcement capabilities in [drug] producing and transit states. 2 0 '
The United States has enacted domestic legislation to implement Article 5 (b) (ii).202 Authority to transfer forfeited assets
to foreign countries is found in 18 U.S.C. § 981(i)(1). 20 3 The
ant to paragraph 4 of article 32 of [said Convention], the Republic of Turkey is not
bound by paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 32 of the Convention"); and Vietnam ("Reservations to article 6 on Extradition, article 32 paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 on Dispute
settlement"). UN Web Page, supra note 18.
197. See INCS REPORT, supra note 1.
198. This subsection is adapted in part from ASSET FoRFEITURE, supra note 139, at
346-47
199. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6.
200. Article 5(5) of the Convention provides:
(a) Proceeds or property confiscated by a party pursuant to paragraph 1 or
paragraph 4 of this article shall be disposed of by that party according to its
domestic law and administrative procedures.
(b) When acting on the request of another party in accordance with this article, a party may give special consideration to concluding agreements on:
(ii) Sharing with other parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds or property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds or property, in accordance with its domestic law, administrative procedures or bilateral or multilateral agreements entered into for this purpose.
U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(5), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
201. Stewart, supra note 20, at 396.
202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(i)(1) (1994).
203. Id. Section 981(i) (1) provides:
Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this chapter, the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, as the case may be, may trans-
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following requirements must be satisfied to transfer forfeited
proceeds to another country: (i) direct or indirect participation
by the country's government in the seizure or forfeiture of the
property; (ii) authorization by the U.S. Attorney General or U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury; (iii) approval of the transfer by the
U.S. Secretary of State; (iv) authorization in an international
agreement between the United States and the other country to
which the property is being transferred; 20 4 and, if applicable, (v)
certification of the country under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.205
Between July 1990 and July 1995, the U.S. Department of
Justice shared US$35.7 million in forfeited proceeds with twenty
foreign countries.20 6 As a general rule, the amount of the forfeited funds shared with the other country should reflect the
contribution of that government in the specific case giving rise
to forfeiture relative to the assistance provided by other domestic
and non-U.S. law enforcement participants.
CONCLUSION
While the United States is a party to several multilateral and
bilateral treaties intended to enhance international cooperation
in narcotics enforcement, clearly the most important of these
international anti-drug treaties is the 1988 U.N. Drug Convenfer the forfeited personal property or the proceeds of the sale of any forfeited
personal or real property to any foreign country which participated directly or
indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property, if such transfer(A) has been agreed to by the Secretary of State;
(B) is authorized in an international agreement between the United States
and the foreign country; and
(C) is made to a country which, if applicable, has been certified under section
481(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Id. Authority to transfer forfeited assets to foreign countries is also found at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1616a(c)(2) (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1) (E) (1994).
204. A bilateral agreement such as a MLAT would satisfy this requirement. See
supra note 55 (providing U.S. MLAT dates and cites).
205. 22 U.S.C. § 2291h (1994).
206. See Snider, supra note 9, at 389. Recipients included Antilles, Argentina, the
Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, Israel, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Romania, Switzerland, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, BUDGET

SUMMARY 98 (1998) ("Equitable sharing with foreign, state, and local governments is
expected to be $196 million in FY 1998, approximately 46.8 percent of the total deposits to the fund.").
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tion. The Convention is significant in that it proposes a multiprong strategy for combating international drug trafficking. Essential to this strategy is the emphasis on attacking the economic aspects of drug trafficking. To this end, the Convention
imposes an obligation on the parties to enact domestic legislation criminalizing money laundering. It further provides for
eliminating the financial incentive for engaging in drug activity
through the forfeiture of illicit drug proceeds and instrumentalities of narcotics trafficking. In addition, the Convention recognizes that no country, by itself, can effectively deal with illicit
drug trafficking alone. Instead, multilateral efforts based on international cooperation must be pursued. The necessity of international, cooperative, counter-drug enforcement efforts is
clearly articulated in Article 2(1), which provides that "[t]he
purpose of th[e] Convention is to promote cooperation among
parties so that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimension. 2 °7
Unfortunately, an examination of party compliance, ten
years after the adoption of the Convention, reveals that in many
instances nations have either been reluctant or simply unwilling
to comply with the obligations imposed thereunder. Over the
past ten years, compliance has been inconsistent, if not erratic.
Several major drug-producing and drug-transit countries have
yet to enact anti-money laundering legislation. Furthermore,
parties that have enacted domestic money laundering laws have
often failed to enforce these provisions aggresively.
International cooperation on forfeiture matters has been
more illusory than real. Since the adpotion of the 1988 U.N.
Drug Convention, the United States has become a party to numerous MLATs intended to implement the Convention. In almost every case, however, these MLATs fall far short of satisfying
the obligations imposed by the Convention with respect to asset
forfeiture. The MLAT provisions are formulated in loose terms
with escape clauses. Often, these provisions constitute nothing
more than suggestions and recommendations, thereby imposing
no duty or obligation to lend law enforcement assistance whatsoever. Perhaps most disturbing, the United States' record of prosecuting international money laundering cases reveals that it has
207. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
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not taken seriously its obligation to punish international money
launderers severely. Federal prosecutors, for whatever reason,
have failed to utilize the full panoply of legal tools enacted to
implement the Convention effectively.
Finally, while Article 32(2) of the Convention confers jurisdiction on the ICJ to settle disputes relating to treaty interpretation and application, several parties, including the United States,
have declared themselves not bound by this article. Apparently,
these parties do not desire to have their conduct towards compliance, or lack thereof, scrutinized by the ICJ. As the result, the
ICJ has been denied jurisdiction under the compulsory jurisdiction theory. Thus, the United States, as well as numerous other
signatories to the Convention, have compromised enforcement
of the Convention through the ICJ.
This compromise of enforcement is particularly unfortunate because the ICJ, as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, is highly regarded by the international community. It is viewed as an impartial and independent tribunal. The
Court represents an important vehicle for judicial enforcement
of the Convention. In the event that a party fails to comply with
a judgment of the ICJ, enforcement could further be aided by
the Security Council. The U.N. Security Council could impose
economic sanctions or take other measures to give effect to the
judgment. As a practical matter, without recourse to the ICJ and
Security Council, the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention is an unenforceable treaty, and international cooperation in narcotics enforcement remains merely illusory.

